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Abstract:
In his book, Better Never to Have Been (Oxford, 2006), David Benatar attempts to show that coming 
into existence is always a serious harm. In order to prove his point, he develops two lines of argument, 
one formal, another material. In this paper I intend to show that: (1) There is a logical problem in the 
formal argumentation that affects the soundness of the supposed “asymmetry” between the absence of 
pleasure and the absence of pain, which constitutes the core of this line of argumentation. (2) Although 
the material argument is basically correct, I maintain that it suffers from the limitations of the theoretical 
approach adopted, of empiricist and Utilitarian type. (3) I discuss briefly the alleged “independence” of 
the two lines of argument trying to show that the formal line depends on the material one.
Key words: existence, pleasure, pain, non-existence, ethics
Resumo:
Em seu livro Better never to Have Been (Oxford, 2006), David Benatar tenta mostrar que vir à existência 
constitui sempre um sério prejuízo. Com o objetivo de provar sua tese ele desenvolve duas linhas de 
argumento, uma formal, outra material. No presente trabalho tento mostrar que: (1) Existe um problema 
lógico na argumentação formal que afeta a correção da suposta “assimetria” entre ausência de prazer 
e ausência de dor, que constitui o cerne desta linha de argumentação; (2) Embora o argumento mate-
rial seja basicamente correto, o mesmo se ressente das limitações da abordagem teórica adotada, de 
caráter empirista e utilitarista; (3) Discuto brevemente a alegada independência entre as linhas formal 
e material, tentando mostrar que a linha formal depende da material.
Palavras-chaves: existência, prazer, dor, nao- existência, etica
Resumen:
En su libro Better Never to Have Been (Oxford, 2006), David Benatar trata de demostrar que venir a 
la existencia constituye siempre un serio perjuicio. Para probar esta tesis, él desarrolla dos líneas de 
argumento, una formal y otra material. En el presente artículo, trato de mostrar que: (1) Existe un pro-
blema lógico en la argumentación formal, que afecta la corrección de la supuesta “asimetría” entre la 
ausencia de placer y la ausencia de dolor, que constituye el núcleo de esta línea de argumentación; (2) 
Aunque la línea material de argumento es básicamente correcta, trato de mostrar que la misma resulta 
perjudicada por el abordaje adoptado, de tipo empirista y utilitarista; (3) Finalmente, discuto brevemente 
la pretendida independencia de las dos líneas de argumento, mostrando que la línea formal depende 
de la material.
Palabras clave: existencia, placer, dolor, no-existencia, ética
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Introduction 
In his book Better never to have been (2006), 
David Benatar claims that coming into existence 
is always a serious harm and that procreation is 
ethically problematic. He presents his basic argu-
ments on Chapters 2 and 3. The line of argument 
of Chapter 2 can be considered as formal, while 
that of Chapter 3 develops a material-type line1. 
In this work, I present logical and methodological 
objections for both lines of argument. Furthermo-
re, I discuss Benatar’s assumption on the alleged 
independence between the two lines. 
1. two notions of “possible being”
In his introduction, Benatar formulates an asym-
metry which he considers to be crucial to the for-
mal argumentation; the asymmetry goes this way: 
“Both good and bad things happen to those who 
exist. However, there is a crucial asymmetry bet-
ween the good and the bad things. The absence 
of bad things, such as pain, is good even if there is 
nobody to enjoy that good, whereas the absence 
of good things, such as pleasure, is bad only if 
there is somebody who is deprived of these good 
things. The implication of this is that the avoidance 
of the bad by never existing is a real advantage 
over existence, whereas the loss of certain goods 
by not existing is not a real disadvantage over ne-
ver existing”. (p. 14). 
He starts his argumentation from two axioms: 
“(1) The presence of pain is bad” and: (2) “The 
presence of pleasure is good” (p. 30), two state-
ments apparently well-established. At the level of 
presence of these things, there seems to be total 
draw. The differences appear in the level of abs-
ences. The relevant assertions are the following: 
“(3) the absence of pain is good, even if that good 
is not enjoyed by anyone” and: “(4) the absence of 
1 This terminology of formal and material is not Bena-
tar’s; I introduce it to facilitate the numerous refer-
ences that I will make here to these two lines of 
thought. 
pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for 
whom this absence is a deprivation” (p. 30)2
According to the author, to understand this asym-
metry between absences one should adopt the 
perspective of potential interests of a “possible 
being” within a counterfactual account. Given the 
crucial importance of this text for my purposes, I 
quote it in full: 
“... (3) can say something about the counterfactual 
case in which a person who does actually exist 
never did exist. Of the pain of an existing person, 
(3) says that the absence of this pain would have 
been good even if this could be achieved only by 
the absence of the person who now suffers it “. 
(p. 31). 
And:
“Claim (3) says that this absence is good when 
judged in terms of the interests of the person who 
would otherwise have existed. We may not know 
who that person would have been, but we can still 
say that whoever that person would have been, 
the avoidance of his or her pain is good when jud-
ged in terms of his or her potential interests. (...) 
Clearly (3) does not entail the absurd literal claim 
that there is some actual person for whom the ab-
sent pain is good “. (p. 31). 
To show that (3) is not an “incoherent” statement, 
Benatar shows it as a statement “with reference 
to the (potential) interests of a person who either 
does or does not exist” (p. 30). As he concedes, 
one could make a consideration of (4) essentially 
identical to that made in (3): 
“One could (logically) make symmetrical claims 
about the absence of pleasure – that, when jud-
ged in terms of the (potential) interests of a person 
who does or does not exist, the absence of plea-
sure is bad”. (p. 31, note 23).
All this line of thought is viable if we keep the same 
concept of “possible being” as counterfactually re-
presented. So, we could paraphrase, for exam-
2 I maintain Benatar’s numeration of the four main asser-
tions to allow the reader’s understanding of my argument 
along the text.
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ple, the statement at the beginning of page 31 in 
the following way: “Of the pleasure of an existing 
person, (4) says that the absence of this pleasure 
would have been bad even if this could only have 
been achieved by the absence of the person who 
now enjoys it”. And the paraphrase may continue 
this way: “Claim (4) says that this absence is bad 
when judged in terms of the interests of the per-
son who would otherwise have existed. We may 
not know who that person would have been, but 
we can still say that whoever that person would 
have been, the avoidance of his or her pleasures 
is bad when judged in terms of his or her potential 
interests”. Just as in the case of the absence of 
pain, this does not imply the absurdity of saying 
that there is really a person to whom the absence 
of pleasure is bad. That is, if we use the same 
notion of “possible being” (the counterfactual no-
tion) in the two cases (absence of pain, absence 
of pleasure), there is no asymmetry at all. 
But immediately in the same footnote (p. 31) 
Benatar adds: “However, (4) suggests that this 
symmetrical claim, although logically possible, is 
actually false”. This suggests that the asymmetry 
cannot be obtained only by means of the formal 
argumentation, but it rather needs the material 
elements from the other line of argument, even 
though Benatar explicitly defends the indepen-
dence between the two lines (for example, in pp. 
14 and 93/4. See last section of the present text). 
But from the strict formal point of view, everything 
seems to “draw”. On that footnote, Benatar conce-
des that the only thing his consideration showed 
so far is that (3) “is not incoherent”. But neither it 
is “incoherent”, from a strictly logical point of view, 
to say that the absence of pleasure is bad even 
when this damage is not suffered by anyone. This 
may be challenged by false or inadequate, but not 
by “incoherent”; so, the non incoherence is not a 
decisive argument in favor of (3). 
If the counterfactual conception of a “possible 
being” is used in the same way when assessing 
the absence of pleasure and the absence of pain, 
the asymmetry would not follow. What is happe-
ning here is that in certain moments of his argu-
mentation, Benatar uses a different notion of “pos-
sible being”, a concept that could be called “emp-
ty”, according to which a “possible being” would be 
the one that simply is not present in the world and 
neither is counterfactually represented. Clearly, 
these two concepts are incompatible: when using 
the counterfactual conception, it is irrelevant that 
the being is not present in the world, since he/she 
is counterfactually represented; and when using 
the empty conception, it is irrelevant making con-
siderations of any kind about the possible being 
because, in this conception, there is no such a 
being at all. Benatar allows the counterfactual 
conception of a possible being when dealing with 
the absence of pain, but he imposes the emp-
ty conception when dealing with the absence of 
pleasure. 
Ideally, someone could say (using the empty con-
ception) that for the absence of pain to be good, 
there has to be someone for whom this absence 
is enjoyable, and (using the counterfactual notion) 
that the absence of pleasure is bad even when 
there is nobody to suffer from it. If the “possible 
being” is conceived in (3) in the empty conception, 
the absence of pain would not be good (or bad), 
and if the “possible being” is conceived in (4) in the 
counterfactual conception, the absence of pleasu-
re would not be not bad, but bad. This would be 
establishing the asymmetry of the way around of 
Benatar, and with the same drawbacks. In fact, to 
stay within the logical requirements, it would be 
right using both for the absence of pleasure and 
the absence of pain, the same conception of “pos-
sible being” whatever it is (counterfactual or emp-
ty). What is illegitimate is to mix them within the 
same line of reasoning. 
Therefore, the argumentation in favor of asymme-
try is imperfect because it applies unilaterally a 
procedure that is based on a fallacy of equivoca-
tion3 in the meaning of the term “possible being”. 
The equivocation is best viewed if we put the 
words “for a possible person” after “the absence 
of pain is good” in (3) and after “the absence of 
pleasure is not bad” in (4) (p. 30). I maintain that 
the expression “for a possible person” does not 
mean the same in the two sentences. 
3 About this fallacy, see Kahane (1998), pp. 69/70; 
Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong (2001), pp. 367/369. 
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2.  Weakness of the  
“support asymmetries”
To strengthen his position, Benatar tries to provide 
indirect evidence or “supports” in favor of the alle-
ged asymmetry between (3) and (4): for example, 
that it has significant “explanatory power” in the 
explanation of other asymmetries usually endor-
sed, such as that there is a duty to avoid bringing 
into existence people who suffer, but there is no 
duty to bring into existence people who enjoy (p. 
32-33), that procreating is not a moral duty (peo-
ple without children are not considered immoral); 
that while it is strange to declare that giving rise 
to someone to benefit him/her, it is not strange to 
declare that one does not give rise to someone to 
free him/her from suffering (34); that by adopting 
the point of view of the possible being, we can only 
regret for having brought somebody into existence 
and not for not bringing him/her (34-35) and, fina-
lly, that on uninhabited land, we do not regret that 
no one lives happily on them, while we regret of 
land inhabited by unhappy people (p. 35). 
Regarding the first support asymmetry, one can 
argue, first, that the symmetry in this case can be 
restored just by the same procedure applied in the 
first case4. Secondly, it seems wrong to claim that 
4 For the sake of brevity, I leave to the reader the ex-
ercise of these paraphrases, which can easily be 
deduced from the aforesaid. Only as a clue, one 
can paraphrase, for example, the statement on the 
beginning of page. 32 by saying, “...the reason why 
we think that there is a duty to bring happy people into 
existence is that the presence of this pleasure would be 
good (for the enjoyers) and the absence of pleasure is 
bad (even though there is nobody to suffer the absence of 
pleasure)”.  Here, we simply allow that the absence 
of pleasure is assessed according to the potential 
concerns of the person (the counterfactual concep-
tion): if counterfactually represented, there is some-
one who is harmed by the absence of pleasure.  On 
the other hand, we could say in strict symmetry: “In 
contrast to this, we think that there is not a duty not to bring 
suffering people into existence because while their pain 
would be bad for them, its absence would not be good 
for them (given that there would be nobody who would be 
benefited from it)”. Here, we allow that the absence 
of pain is assessed according to a non-represented 
being (the empty conception):  if there is no real be-
ing, no one can be “benefited”.  
 
there is not, in our societies, a duty to procreate, 
if understood as a moral duty. Indeed, the moral 
character of an obligation is seen in the actual at-
titudes and behaviors of a group, rather than in 
effective punishment mechanisms (with which the 
obligation would cease to be moral to become le-
gal). In the case of procreation, the moral charac-
ter of its obligation is clearly seen in the following 
evidence: (1) There is social pressure for people 
to have children, pressure that can become inten-
se, embarrassing and even threatening (e.g., ge-
nerating suspicion of homosexuality, perversion, 
bad character, etc. on those who do not procrea-
te), (2) There are incentives and social benefits for 
those with children, which shows that, in the im-
possibility of having a law enforcing reproduction, 
mechanisms are established for non reproductive 
people not to enjoy these benefits, (3) Within the 
prevailing view, life is regarded as something very 
valuable, and therefore, it is ethically correct to 
have children, and the contrary position is con-
sidered “selfish”, especially if the person enjoys 
“a good quality of life”. This leads to the idea that 
there is a moral obligation to procreate, and if a 
certain tolerance exists this is something typical 
of a requirement of moral type, since there are no 
effective constraints to force people to reproduce. 
For all this, it does not seem that this new “as-
ymmetry” is in good condition to provide plausi-
ble “support” for the first one. And the others are 
even weaker: the notion of “stranger” is dubious, 
subjective and socially relative, but even conside-
ring the term as it usually works, it is false that it 
is “strange” that people justify having children in 
terms of the benefits they cause them, and many 
people accept that this should lead to try to have 
as many children as possible. Only when we re-
fer to children who will be born very sick, it is not 
“strange” to say that we avoid having them for 
their own sake. On the contrary, it would sound 
very “strange” in our society to say that we will not 
have children to avoid them from the hardships of 
life, when there is not a specific disease or impair-
ment. 
Following with the other “support asymmetries” 
considered plausible, of course one can regret 
for the children’s sake the fact that they were not 
born, under the very common argument that if 
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they could give their opinion, the children that will 
be born healthy would like to live and wish that 
their mothers would not abort them. In the current 
situation, the parents think they are benefiting 
their children by having them, and later the vast 
majority of children think that they were actua-
lly benefited. Finally, it is perfectly plausible that 
someone knows an uninhabited island and think 
of how much pleasurable this place would be if 
it had, for example, an amusement park; there is 
nothing “strange” in the fact that someone with this 
project in mind who could not achieve it for some 
reason, feels sorry for the many people who could 
enjoy it and will be without this pleasure. 
I think, then, that none of these other presumed 
asymmetries, even though they may be widely en-
dorsed by the multitude (p. 36), is stronger than 
the initial one, so that they cannot work as its “sup-
port”. Nevertheless, Benatar attempts to extract 
the result that coming into existence is always 
a serious harm from this supposed asymmetry, 
which appears to him to be well established. To 
do this, he analyzes “scenarios” in several figures. 
In figure 2.1 (p. 38), there is a scenario A, where 
X already exists, and a scenario B, where X never 
existed. In scenario A, there is pleasure and pain 
and in scenario B, there is lack of both things. The 
point is that, according to Benatar, in scenario A, 
the presence of pain is bad (assertion 1) and the 
presence of pleasure is good (assertion 2) for the 
existing being, but in scenario B, while the absen-
ce of pain is good (assertion 3), the absence of 
pleasure is neither good nor bad (assertion 4) for 
the possible being, and, in particular, it is not bad5. 
The obvious reply would be saying that, symme-
trically, in scenario B, since X does not exist, the 
absence of pain is good and the absence of plea-
sure is bad, but this is precisely what Benatar re-
jects. Because, according to him, when someone 
does not exist, the fact of not having pleasure is 
not bad, but we can say that it is good for this pos-
sible being not to suffer from pain (p. 38). When 
considering the attempts to restore symmetry, Be-
5 I repeat here the numerations of the original in order to 
help following the exposition; readers who have Benatar’s 
book in hands can observe the figures directly and dis-
pense with this didactical procedure. 
natar says that the one who held that the absence 
of pleasure of the possible being in scenario B is 
bad (as reflected in the figure 2.2, p. 39), would be 
supporting a “too strong” thesis (p. 38), while he 
considers “too weak” (p. 39) to attempt to restore 
symmetry saying that, in scenario B of the non-
existent being, nor the absence of pain nor the 
presence of pleasure would be good or bad (as 
reflected in the figure 2.3. , p. 40). 
According to my previous argumentation, I believe 
that both alternatives are perfectly correct: in figu-
re 2.2, in both cases the possible being is conside-
red in the counterfactual conception; and in figure 
2.3., in both cases the possible being is conside-
red in the empty conception. These two possibili-
ties do not make the mix of “possible being” con-
ceptions, and that is why the symmetry is properly 
preserved in these figures. In 2.2, the absence of 
pain is good and the absence of pleasure is bad, 
for a possible being that if he could choose, he 
would choose this way (i.e., for a possible being 
counterfactually conceived); in 2.3, both the ab-
sence of pain and absence of pleasure is neither 
good nor bad, since, in the empty conception, the-
re is simply no one who suffer or enjoy, and there 
is no representation of their preferences. This is a 
total draw. 
Benatar coherently believes that 2.2. is “too 
strong” because if the absence of pleasure is con-
sidered bad “... we should have to regret, for X’s 
sake, that X did not come into existence. But it is 
not regrettable “(38-39). But I have already shown 
that it may well be regretted, which shows that 
2.2. is not “too strong” at all. Examining the other 
case, Benatar correctly says that in 2.3., “not bad” 
means “not bad, but not good either.” “Interpreted 
in this way, however, it is too weak. Avoiding the 
pains of existence is more than merely ‘not bad’. 
It is good” (p. 39). But this may be the case for 
existing people; for non-existing ones, saying that 
neither the absence of pain or pleasure are neither 
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good nor bad it is perfectly appropriate, and not 
“weak”6. 
3.  Crossing argumentation  
between absence/presence  
and existing/not-existing dualisms
If symmetry can always be restored in the indi-
cated manner, the pessimistic results of Benatar 
about that not existing is always preferable to exis-
ting (even in a life with pleasures) do not follow. 
He states (p. 41) that it is clear that the absence of 
pain in scenario B (where X never existed) is bet-
ter than the presence of pain in scenario A (where 
X exists). But this, if I am right, has not been pro-
ven. If it is allowed to the possible being simply not 
being anything (without counterfactual represen-
tation), it makes no sense to say that the absence 
of pain in scenario B is better than the presence 
of pain in scenario A, because one possible being 
in this empty sense cannot be “benefited” from the 
absence of pain. On the other hand, Benatar ar-
gues that the absence of pleasure in scenario B is 
better than the presence of pleasure in scenario A, 
because nobody is deprived of anything in B. But I 
have already shown that restoring symmetry, i.e., 
allowing the possible being to be counterfactually 
represented, makes perfect sense to say that the 
absence of pleasure in scenario B is worse than 
6  There is not a unique way to formulate the equivo-
cation problem in Benatar’s formal argumentation. In 
her critical study of Benatar’s book, Elisabeth Harman un-
derstands this equivocation as occurring between “imper-
sonal goodness” and “goodness for a person” (Harman 
(2009), p. 780), although her line of argumentation 
is different from mine. The equivocation could also 
be presented in a more sophisticated logical bias as 
occurring in the very notion of “existing” considered 
as a logical quantifier (in expressions such as “there 
is no one who ...”, “ ... unless there is someone who 
...”, etc.). Indeed, in (3) the expression “by anyone” 
would be understood as a quantifier whose scope 
would be possible objects, whereas in (4), “there is 
somebody” would be understood as a quantifier on 
real objects. When considering the absence of pain, 
the verb to exist refers to possible objects, whereas 
when considering the absence of pleasure, the verb 
to exist refers to real objects. I cannot develop these 
topics here. 
 
the presence of pleasure in scenario A,  because 
a possible being in this sense may be harmed by 
the absence of pleasure, in a counterfactual con-
sideration.  
All these problems arise in the application of the 
terms “absence of pain” and “absence of pleasu-
re” to existing and to non-existing beings. It seems 
partial to put the comparison between scenarios 
A and B only en terms of a confrontation between 
presences on one side and absences on another, 
since scenario A also shows absences; scenario 
A is in fact a combination of presences and abs-
ences (both of pain and pleasure), while in scena-
rio B, obviously, we have only absences. Benatar 
admits that these possibilities are not reflected in 
his matrix (p. 41), although they are implicit. But 
this point is too important as to keep it in the bac-
kground, because it will have decisive influence at 
the time of the comparisons between scenarios A 
and B. 
When comparing the presence of pain in existing 
people and the absence of pain in non-existing 
people, Benatar says: “In the first comparison we 
see that non-existence is preferable to existence. 
Non-existence has an advantage over existence 
“(pp. 40/41). But this is much less uncontroversial 
than it seems if we look at the difference between 
“absence of pain or pleasure existing” and “absen-
ce of pain or pleasure by not existing.” Benatar at-
tempts to support his assertion on the apparently 
indisputable fact that the absence of pain is better 
than the presence of pain, but it is not clear that 
the absence of pain by not existing is better than 
the presence of pain existing, due to the high pri-
ce we should pay for not existing. If Benatar ar-
gues that it is not a high price because existing 
is always a serious harm, it is precisely this point 
that the asymmetry would have to demonstrate, 
and not to presume. It seems that we must already 
have the (material) proof that non-existing is better 
than existing to accept the absence of pain by not 
existing is always better than the presence of pain 
existing. Here, we move in a circle. 
In the case of absence of pleasure, he states: 
“In the second comparison...the pleasures of the 
existent, although good, are not an advantage 
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over non-existence, because the absence of plea-
sures is not bad. For the good to be an advantage 
over non-existence, it would have to have been 
the case that its absence was bad”. (p. 41). 
I have already shown to be perfectly plausible 
to accept this as being precisely the case if we 
use “possible person” in the counterfactual way. 
Benatar’s statement intends to rely on the appa-
rently undisputed fact that the absence of not 
depriving pleasure is better than the absence of 
depriving pleasure, but it is not so obvious that the 
absence of not depriving pleasure due to the fact 
that the person does not exist is better than the 
absence of depriving pleasure when the person 
exists, and as before, he presupposes that it had 
already been shown that non-existence is always 
better than existence, which is precisely what is in 
question.
Benatar makes here a mistake that he complains 
against the hypothetical opponents who object 
that “good” should be an advantage over “not bad” 
because the feeling of pleasure is better than a 
neutral state (p. 41). He complains that this is trea-
ting “absence of pleasure” in scenario B (of never 
existing people) as if it were similar to the “absen-
ce of pleasure” in scenario A (of existing people); 
but he does the same in the case of the “absence 
of pain”: he makes no difference between feeling 
pain existing (scenario A) and not feeling pain by 
not existing (scenario B). The presence of pain in 
A is worse than the absence of pain in A, but not 
necessarily worse than the absence of pain in B 
obtained at the price of not existing. In any case, 
it seems illegitimate and partial to compare abs-
ences (of anything) in absolute terms, instead of 
comparing absences within existence and absen-
ces paying the price of not existing.
To give more strength to his asymmetry, Benatar 
presents (p. 42) an analogy: we have two persons, 
S and H, S has a tendency to fall ill, but with ability 
to recover quickly; H does not have this ability, but 
this person never gets sick. Thus, it is bad for S 
to get sick and good for S to recover quickly, but 
while it is good for H never being sick, not having 
quick recovery is neither good nor bad. From this, 
it follows that the state of S is not better than the 
state of H, since a world where I can get sick and 
recover quickly is not better than a world where I 
never get sick. The analogy with the birth seems 
clear. But yet in this analogy, the same problem 
identified above is present, because one can ar-
gue that H is not better than S, because although 
it is better, in scenario A, not getting sick than get-
ting sick, this may not be the case if never getting 
sick is paid with the price of not existing. There 
is one important difference between never getting 
sick for not being born and never getting sick be-
cause I was born and have a very good health. 
This suggests that it could be better to get sick 
existing than never getting sick by simply not exis-
ting. It appears again that the asymmetry already 
needs the material thesis that not existing is better 
than existing, which is precisely what was inten-
ded to be proven by the asymmetry.
In the last chapter of his book, Benatar states that 
there are many problems for those who reject the 
asymmetry. One of them would be to accept that 
we have a moral reason, and perhaps a duty, to 
create people for them not to be deprived of the 
pleasure, or that we should regret that we do not 
bring people to the world or the fact that they do not 
live in a pleasant place, etc. But, as was shown, 
there is nothing wrong in these consequences 
from the strictly formal point of view; on the con-
trary, they seem formally compelling. On the other 
hand, Benatar says that rejecting the asymmetry 
would lead us to accept that we do not have good 
moral reasons, based on the interests of a possi-
ble suffering person to prevent his/her birth, nor 
could we regret having brought him/her to existen-
ce based on these sufferings, nor we should want 
people who suffer miserably in some part of the 
world to never being born. But again, none of the-
se consequences is wrong from the strict formal 
point of view; they just do not fit in Benatar’s con-
victions about life. Benatar is convinced that this 
is a life of suffering and that people should not be 
born and we can perhaps agree with him; but only 
the alleged asymmetry between absence of plea-
sure and pain cannot establish these arguments; 
in fact, it has to presuppose them; this undermines 
the thesis of the independence between the two 
lines of argument (as I will show in OJO).
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4.  benatar’s material argumenta-
tion: limits of the empiricist approach
The formal argumentation tried to show that not 
being born does not harm (on the contrary, it be-
nefits); the material argumentation will be devoted 
to showing how being born harms a lot. Within an 
empiricist and Utilitarian stance of the calculation 
of losses and benefits, Benatar said it would be a 
mistake to evaluate the quality of human life by a 
simple absolute summation: one evil for one good. 
We must understand how these goods and evils 
are “distributed” in existence (p. 62), the intensity 
of pain and pleasure, life extension, and the fact 
of having lived experiences so bad (such as to 
lose body parts) that no good can compensate. 
It is a fact that all people permanently suffer from 
fatigue, hunger, thirst, intestinal malaise, thermal 
differences, pain, lethargy, frustration with disabi-
lities, headaches, allergies, chills, stomach aches, 
heat flows, nausea, hyperglycemia, guilt, shame, 
boredom, sadness, depression, loneliness, dissa-
tisfaction with their bodies and suffering for more 
serious illnesses of those we love or of ourselves 
(p. 71).  Human desires are compelling and distur-
bing (p. 75) and human life, in a cosmic point of 
view, seems to lack any sense. Chapter 3 ends in 
apocalypse, talking about natural disasters, hun-
ger (89), devastating diseases (90) and violence 
(91). The presence of “well-known features of hu-
man psychology” may explain the positive opinion 
that people have, in general, of their own lives: 
the tendency to optimism, the incredible ability to 
adapt to new circumstances, however painful, and 
the tendency to compare our lives with other’s and 
coming out winning in comparison (p. 64 - 69).  
In this methodology, the poor quality of life is 
shown through an empirical assessment of evils 
and benefits, where these are considered as ob-
jects susceptible of manipulation and measure-
ment. But experience is always open to new in-
formation and pondering. Benatar’s pessimism is 
based on the world as it currently is, but in some 
moments he refers to how the world could be di-
fferent. On page 79, he imagines a world where, 
in the dynamics of desires, the period between 
deprivation and fulfillment is unnecessary, so that 
pleasure was immediately obtained; and on page 
84, he imagines a world in which human life was 
much longer, devoid of pain and frustration and 
with much greater capacity to acquire understan-
ding. Benatar accuses people, for not having suffi-
cient imagination to conceive these worlds better 
than ours, but one could think that the opposite is 
happening at present: the scientific and technolo-
gical imagination just escaped from all limits. 
Nowadays, it is thought, for example, in a world 
where medicine could, in the not so distant future, 
discover the secrecy of aging and make people 
simply no longer die from aging and start to live 
indefinitely, or a world where the replacement of 
deficient organs by new ones would be very sim-
ple, or where serious illnesses were things of the 
past7. They talk about a genetic program of well-
being, change of the eco-system and re-writing of 
the genome, seeking for a world full of unprece-
dented benefits, which would greatly compensate 
the still remaining damages. In this view, Homo 
Sapiens would be the only species able to free the 
world from suffering, so that it is vital that humans 
can survive on earth. Benatar could accuse the 
authors of these ideas of anything, but of “lack of 
imagination.” According to them, it would be ratio-
nal and ethical continuing to generate people in 
a world still bad, but with good perspectives for 
improvement even if it is the result of a mammoth 
task that still takes many generations. I do not see 
how merely empiricist and Utilitarian methodolo-
gies can deal successfully with this type of objec-
tion. 
In the context of Benatar’s material argumen-
tation, we find some mixture of these Utilitarian 
strategies and quotes from Schopenhauer that is 
supposed to “illustrate” them. But this is curious 
because the Schopenhauer’s method of inquiry 
has nothing to do with the Utilitarian method. 
Schopenhauer attempts to show the poor quality 
of life through a consideration of a structural na-
ture: humans are endowed of mortality since their 
birth, of a tremendous anxiety of affirmation in life, 
and of a brain big enough to clearly see their tra-
7  Cfr. Benecke (2002). 
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gedy. Their suffering is therefore unavoidable, and 
not due to mere empirical reasons8. Suffering, for 
Schopenhauer, in the form of pain, boredom, and 
moral failure, is not a mere empirical fact, but a 
necessary feature of existence9. Benatar employs 
Utilitarian calculus to get his results, based on the 
mere predominance of evils on goods, but on the 
other, he celebrates Schopenhauer, whose pessi-
mism is based on the problematic character of the 
structural origin of life, and not on the mere gains 
and losses. 
The odd thing is that the structural elements are 
not absent in the book of Benatar, but mixed with 
the Utilitarian resources. For example, every time 
he alludes death and disease, or the insatiable 
desiring mechanisms (p. 74), he is actually poin-
ting to structural elements of life that should not 
be put to the same level as allergies, headaches 
or injustice; there may be lives without them, but 
they are all decaying and terminal. But the mo-
ment where Benatar best visualizes the structu-
re of human life is the last chapter, when trying 
to resolve the apparent paradox that, being birth 
bad, death must also be considered bad. For the 
philosophical common sense argues as follows: 
since being born was bad, to die must be good. 
Benatar answers to this question in an appropriate 
way, but in doing so, he clearly shows the mix of 
empirical and structural methodologies: 
 “...it is because we (usually) have an interest in 
continuing to exist that death may be thought of 
as a harm, even though coming into existence is 
also a harm. Indeed, the harm of death may par-
tially explain why coming into existence is a harm. 
Coming into existence is bad in part because 
it invariably leads to the harm of ceasing to 
exist” (p. 213, my emphasis). 
8 Schopenhauer (2005), Part IV, sections 56 to 59.  
9 Even attenuating his own pessimism, Schopenhau-
er states that, precisely, this inevitable and neces-
sary feature of suffering should give relief to humans 
because their condition would be even worse if the 
pain was something contingent that could somehow 
have been avoided.  (Schopenhauer (2005), Book 
IV, section 57, p. 411).  
 
Here, Benatar finds out that being born mortally 
and dying punctually (some day) are just aspects 
of one and the same process: being born mortal is 
already starting to die, and that is why both issues 
are bad, because they are intrinsically connected. 
The use of structural elements by Benatar is qui-
te curious, because, on the one hand, he openly 
acknowledges the “unavoidable” and “endemic” 
character of pain in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of 
life (pp. 76-77), without seeing that this contradicts 
the idea that there is nothing “necessary” in the 
harm of coming into existence (p. 29). 
The structural point of view of Schopenhauer, I 
think, is better equipped to meet the objections of 
meliorists such as Doyal, who believes in the “bra-
ve new world”: the crucial problem would not be in 
changing worlds, but purely and simply in beco-
ming one world (any world); the mortality of emer-
gence of a world will continue to exist in this world 
without disease or aging, for when the technical 
procedures to obtain these benefits were availa-
ble, they will block the birth of new generations, 
not mentioning the many social, political and eco-
nomic conflicts that these scientific advantages 
will bring. Therefore, if the material argumentation 
is convincing, it will be for the structural elements 
it contains, rather than due to the efficacy of the 
mere Utilitarian calculation. 
5.  On the alleged independence  
between formal and material  
argumentation
At various moments in his book, Benatar states 
that the two lines of argument, formal and mate-
rial, are independent: 
“The arguments in the third chapter thus provide 
independent grounds even for those who are not 
persuaded by the arguments in the second chap-
ter to accept the claim that coming into existence 
is always a (serious) harm” (p. 14). 
And: 
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“There is more than one way to reach this conclu-
sion. Those who reject the arguments in Chapter 
2 that coming into existence is always a harm may 
nonetheless be persuaded by the arguments in 
Chapter 3 that our lives are actually very bad” (p. 
93 / 4). 
At the beginning of Chapter 3, the author insists 
that evidence independent from asymmetry will be 
provided (p. 61), as a “continuation” of the argu-
ments of Chapter 2, where nothing was said about 
the magnitude of the harm imposed to those who 
are born. With this, it is assumed that the issue 
has already been well established, and in Chapter 
3 we will see only how serious the situation really 
is. This suggests that what is really important has 
already been shown by the formal demonstration, 
and that arguments of  Chapter 3 could, ultimately, 
be exempted (having been proven that life is bad, 
maybe it is just emphatic showing that it is very 
bad). 
I hold the exact opposite is the case: while I agree 
with Benatar that the material arguments do not 
need the formal ones (based on the supposed as-
ymmetry), the inverse situation is not the case: the 
formal arguments need the material arguments. 
This dependence appears for the first time when, 
just before asymmetry is presented, Benatar uses 
several lines (from page 32) on issues of material 
type (“As a matter of fact, bad things happen to all 
of us”, “No life is without hardship”, etc.), and to 
face the well-known optimistic objection that “also 
good things happen to those who exist,” he pre-
sents the asymmetry. But my previous arguments, 
if correct, show that the formal line is not able to 
show alone that failing to procreate does not harm 
(and that, to the contrary, it benefits), or that not 
existing is always better than existing. Precisely, 
because in the purely formal level, symmetries are 
restored, the material elements are required to de-
cide the issue in favor of the pessimistic view. 
Indeed, after knowing the material evidence that 
human life is very bad because we are constantly 
disturbed by unpleasantness, devoured by insa-
tiable desires and shaken by the meaninglessness 
of life, we can accept that not feeling pain by not 
existing is better than feeling pain existing, becau-
se we now know that existing is very bad: if not 
to feel pain we have to pay the price of not exis-
ting, we know now that this price is not too high. 
On the other hand, we can also accept that not 
depriving pleasure by not existing is better than 
depriving pleasure existing, for now we know that 
existing is very bad: if to feel pleasure, we have to 
pay the price of existing, now we know this price 
is too high. But this makes the material evidence 
much more important than it was, and especially 
than Benatar himself thinks it was, no longer con-
sidering it as mere “continuation” or supplement of 
something that would have been proven before. 
I think this evidence of the dependence of formal 
arguments over the material ones suggests that 
perhaps it would have been better for Benatar’s 
argumentative procedure, to reverse the order of 
the chapters, i.e., to quickly dispose of material 
evidence about the poor quality of human life to 
go better equipped to the formal line. However, gi-
ven this situation, one could maintain something 
much stronger: not that the order of the chapters 
should be reversed, but that all the formal argu-
mentation could be waived. Given the dependen-
ce of formal argumentation over the material one, 
the many problems of formal argumentation and 
the great power of the material line (especially if 
improved with a clear explanation of the structu-
ral elements), one could simply dismiss the argu-
ments of Chapter 2 and support the demonstra-
tion of the main theses of the book (that coming 
into existence is always a serious harm and that 
procreation is ethically problematic) only on the 
material arguments, without having to use support 
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